Not even Munich, simply a meltdown
By Ayaz Amir
22 April 2005Chamberlain kow-towed before Hitler at Munich, allowing Hitler to go ahead with the rape of Czechoslovakia, assuming that this was the price for averting war. "Peace in our lifetime," he proclaimed on his return to London even as the German Wehrmacht moved into Czechoslovakia.
Although disastrously wrong, Chamberlain at least was motivated by good intentions - the old story of the road to hell being paved with good intentions. President Musharraf of Pakistan doesn't even have Chamberlain's excuse. There is no war threatening to break out between India and Pakistan. It is all quiet on the eastern front, quieter than it has ever been in living memory.
And yet, for no rhyme or reason - or at least none comprehensible to mortal man - he has just done a mini-Munich in Delhi, effectively agreeing to the Indian position on key issues and getting only bland words and good intentions in return.
No wonder India and the Indian establishment, not to forget the Indian media, are ecstatic, at a loss for words to express their elation at Pakistan, under a military ruler, no less, finally playing on India's pitch, working on India's agenda, and far from feeling any sense of loss or shame, revelling in the spirit of surrender.
If any civilian ruler - Nawaz Sharif, Benazir, et al - had the gall or temerity to show one-fortieth of this 'flexibility,' the tanks would have been put on high alert - not to move against India, perish the thought, but - to move against Islamabad, with ISPR (the military's propaganda arm) muttering through gritted teeth that the civilians were selling out Pakistan.
Don't blame India for developing a vested interest not in Pakistani democracy - for under democracy whether perfect, half-baked or imperfect, Pakistan has avoided the path of unseemly compromise - but in Pakistani militarism whence all the concessions come.
Handing over the rights to our three eastern rivers...under military rule; the folly of the '65 war...military rule; loss of East Pakistan and military defeat in the east...military rule; Kargil...not under military rule but military auspices; the abandonment of Kashmir, for that is what the new diplomacy signals ...under 'enlightened' military rule.
Going to war over Kashmir? Of course not. Folly in the past, it is not even an option now. But saying farewell to Kashmir like this, and dancing to India's tune in the process, abandoning the Kashmiris to their fate, and getting nothing in return - not even an undertaking to settle Siachen or solve the dispute over the Baglihar Dam, this surely is a novel way of waging peace.
We may have beaten India in cricket but the self-inflicted thrashing Pakistan is receiving in the diplomatic field is a higher plane of endeavour altogether. Musharraf needn't have gone all the way to Delhi to be told there could be no "re-drawing of borders in Kashmir". That's the Indian line, always has been, much before Manmohan Singh's baptism as prime minister.
While India is entitled to take what position it likes, there should have been no compulsion for a Pakistani leader to go along without even a whimper about the UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir, the basis, after all, of our Kashmir policy? Drive a stake through the plebiscite/self-determination principle and Pakistan is left with no leg to stand on as far as the Kashmir dispute is concerned.
But time to 'think outside the box', Pakistan's soldier-president advises. Excellent if this was a two-way process, if not only Pakistan but India too was ready for the same walk.
What do we see instead? Pakistan under military guidance doing all the visionary thing by itself: not only thinking outside the box but frantically jumping out of it, consigning the carcass of its Kashmir policy to the waters of the Arabian Sea, even as India sticks resolutely to its own box, not prepared to give so much as a centimetre either way.
In simpler times such unilateralism went by the name of 'capitulation'. Now it is called a 'paradigm shift'. Why did Musharraf invite himself to Delhi? What gates of Somnath was he hoping to bring back? What he has achieved is a lesson in Indian diplomacy: Manmohan Singh mincing no words in restating the Indian position that Kashmir geography was set in stone and that the utmost to be hoped for lay in the new mantra of 'porous borders'.
Far from getting Manmohan Singh to commit anything in return, on Siachen, Baglihar, etc, Musharraf tried to do India another favour by trying to sell the Indian line on Kashmir to the Kashmiri leadership, advising them to use their "brains" to understand the necessity of talking to India.
India doesn't give a damn for the 'soft' face of the Kashmiri leadership as represented by the Hurriyet. Its main concern is not to engage with anyone in Kashmir politically but to crush insurgency in the Valley militarily, for which it thinks this is the best time, thanks to the last of Musharraf's historic u-turns: this time on the "core issue" of Kashmir.
Musharraf could at least have argued for the release of Kashmiri prisoners in Indian jails and for an easing of the human rights situation in the Valley. There is nothing to suggest that these concerns were raised or that India conceded anything on these points.
So the situation is like this: even as Musharraf bangs the drums of peace, Indian army operations in the Valley intensify, with many top-ranking Kashmiri militants killed in recent weeks.
Pakistan should be under no illusion that once militancy in the Valley dies down, India will have the same urgency to engage with it as at present. Like it or not, the present peace process is underpinned by Kashmiri blood and tears.
Once the Indians take care of Kashmiri militancy, they will deal with the Kashmir situation on their terms. This is the lesson of history. Back to 1972: this is the direction in which the peace process is headed. Don't blame the Kashmiris for being dejected.
The foreign office now says India must stop construction on the Baglihar Dam if it was sincere in resolving the dispute. This is wonderful. In the Delhi joint statement, there are passing references to Siachen and Sir Creek, none to Baglihar. The place to make a pitch about Baglihar was Delhi, not the foreign office briefing room in Islamabad.
The joint statement as a whole is a limp document from Pakistan's point of view but from India's an undisguized triumph, breaking no new ground, merely restating old positions. If anything, the reference to Kashmir is more watered down than before.
It is a bit audacious than for the foreign office to describe the joint statement as a "landmark statement". If this is the foreign office's definition of "landmark", it will run out of adjectives if something truly dramatic were to occur.
Another aspect of this exercise in furious back-pedalling is also noteworthy. Capitulation of this kind should at the very least bring some colour of shame to Pakistani cheeks.
Instead, far from feeling sorry, the outlook of our leadership is positively jaunty as it accepts India's point of view. When the military made war, it made no sense to anyone. When it makes peace it swings to the other extreme, its pacifism making as little sense as its jingoism.