DailyTimes columnist sees the Kashmir issue being frozen
Realism sets in —Rashed Rahman
President General Pervez Musharraf’s visit to India and the meeting with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have produced both hope and scepticism among commentators on both sides of the border. General Musharraf himself has characterised the exchanges in New Delhi between the two sides as constituting the irreversibility of the peace process between Pakistan and India and as a “breakthrough”. The contrast with the failure in the Agra summit in 2001 could not be more glaring. It is well to keep in mind though, that the Agra summit 2001 and the New Delhi summit 2005 are separated by 9/11. This defines and helps explain the difference between the two outcomes.
What exactly has been achieved in New Delhi 2005? On the part of the Pakistani military establishment a coming down to earth and acceptance of undeniable realities. These realities dictate recognition of the fact that India has outstripped Pakistan in economic, military and diplomatic strength. Our repeated forays into the uncomfortable territory of being the ‘most allied ally of the US’, far from reaping the touted benefits, have produced nothing but disappointment and pathos. Neither diplomatic means nor resort to war (conventional and irregular) over almost six decades helped nudge Pakistan any nearer to its goal of resolving the Kashmir issue, the greatest cause of contention between the two neighbouring countries.
Washington, meanwhile, has discovered post-9/11 the economic and strategic importance of India, especially as a counterweight in Asia and the world to the growing clout of China. Alliance with the US, even when it was prepared (fitfully) to provide modern weapons to our armed forces, did not live up to the hopes and expectations of the military establishment, Washington’s ‘best friend’ in Pakistan.
Pakistan has accepted in New Delhi that its traditional stand based on the 1948-49 UN Security Council resolutions no longer finds a sympathetic international audience. The only way out now therefore, given India’s preponderance in military, economic and strategic terms globally, and the reluctance of the Bush administration (General Musharraf’s most ardent backers in the US) to go beyond nudging both Pakistan and India to settle their issues peacefully through bilateral negotiations, is to go for a historic compromise. That is exactly what has transpired in New Delhi.
General Musharraf has accepted Manmohan Singh’s proposition that “borders cannot be redrawn” while rejecting accepting the Line of Control as an international border. In turn, India has not underlined its usual insistence on an end to the so-called “cross-border terrorism” as a precondition for meaningful talks and progress. General Musharraf has spoken of “soft” borders before embarking on his journey.
The two sides have translated this in black and white in the Joint Statement after the summit by accepting the need for an enhanced bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad; allowing trucks to ply the same route to encourage trade between the two sides of divided Kashmir; a new bus route between Amritsar and Lahore, later to be extended to Nankana Sahib; and the implementation of the decision to open the Khokropar-Munabao border.
These steps represent a softening of the borders, or at the very least, normalisation of the border regime between the two countries. On the contentious issues of Siachen and Sir Creek, it is back to the drawing board. On Kashmir, the likely eventual outcome of the present series of confidence building measures will be a scaling down of the insurgency and of the Indian military and security forces’ presence in Indian-held Kashmir and an internal political compact between New Delhi and Srinagar and Islamabad and Muzaffarabad for autonomy, democracy and genuine special status to the two halves of the state. Whether this will meet General Musharraf’s criteria of a ‘final’ solution that satisfies Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris, is a moot point. General Musharraf has warned that unless such a solution is found, although he is now prepared to give it more time, the problem could erupt again some years down the road.
For the moment at least, the potential ‘spoilers’ of a series of concessions on Kashmir by both sides, have failed to create any momentum despite the attack on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service. As a consequence perhaps, the Hizbul Mujahideen, the largest Kashmiri guerrilla group, has in principle accepted the possibility of a ceasefire, should New Delhi propose any such measure.
It is axiomatic by now, but was not sufficiently clear to our military establishment and policy makers in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, that their reversal on the Afghan policy left the door ajar to the likely, reversal of jihad in Kashmir since all irregular warfare struggles would more than likely find themselves lumped into the ‘terrorist’ basket. That has now come to pass. History may therefore have passed by the armed militant movement in Kashmir. Whether they accept this or not, their best bet now appears to be to bide their time and explore whatever political openings present themselves during the continuing talks between Pakistan and India to normalise their overall relations and find a compromise on Kashmir that can prove acceptable to all.
President General Pervez Musharraf’s visit to India and the meeting with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have produced both hope and scepticism among commentators on both sides of the border. General Musharraf himself has characterised the exchanges in New Delhi between the two sides as constituting the irreversibility of the peace process between Pakistan and India and as a “breakthrough”. The contrast with the failure in the Agra summit in 2001 could not be more glaring. It is well to keep in mind though, that the Agra summit 2001 and the New Delhi summit 2005 are separated by 9/11. This defines and helps explain the difference between the two outcomes.
What exactly has been achieved in New Delhi 2005? On the part of the Pakistani military establishment a coming down to earth and acceptance of undeniable realities. These realities dictate recognition of the fact that India has outstripped Pakistan in economic, military and diplomatic strength. Our repeated forays into the uncomfortable territory of being the ‘most allied ally of the US’, far from reaping the touted benefits, have produced nothing but disappointment and pathos. Neither diplomatic means nor resort to war (conventional and irregular) over almost six decades helped nudge Pakistan any nearer to its goal of resolving the Kashmir issue, the greatest cause of contention between the two neighbouring countries.
Washington, meanwhile, has discovered post-9/11 the economic and strategic importance of India, especially as a counterweight in Asia and the world to the growing clout of China. Alliance with the US, even when it was prepared (fitfully) to provide modern weapons to our armed forces, did not live up to the hopes and expectations of the military establishment, Washington’s ‘best friend’ in Pakistan.
Pakistan has accepted in New Delhi that its traditional stand based on the 1948-49 UN Security Council resolutions no longer finds a sympathetic international audience. The only way out now therefore, given India’s preponderance in military, economic and strategic terms globally, and the reluctance of the Bush administration (General Musharraf’s most ardent backers in the US) to go beyond nudging both Pakistan and India to settle their issues peacefully through bilateral negotiations, is to go for a historic compromise. That is exactly what has transpired in New Delhi.
General Musharraf has accepted Manmohan Singh’s proposition that “borders cannot be redrawn” while rejecting accepting the Line of Control as an international border. In turn, India has not underlined its usual insistence on an end to the so-called “cross-border terrorism” as a precondition for meaningful talks and progress. General Musharraf has spoken of “soft” borders before embarking on his journey.
The two sides have translated this in black and white in the Joint Statement after the summit by accepting the need for an enhanced bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad; allowing trucks to ply the same route to encourage trade between the two sides of divided Kashmir; a new bus route between Amritsar and Lahore, later to be extended to Nankana Sahib; and the implementation of the decision to open the Khokropar-Munabao border.
These steps represent a softening of the borders, or at the very least, normalisation of the border regime between the two countries. On the contentious issues of Siachen and Sir Creek, it is back to the drawing board. On Kashmir, the likely eventual outcome of the present series of confidence building measures will be a scaling down of the insurgency and of the Indian military and security forces’ presence in Indian-held Kashmir and an internal political compact between New Delhi and Srinagar and Islamabad and Muzaffarabad for autonomy, democracy and genuine special status to the two halves of the state. Whether this will meet General Musharraf’s criteria of a ‘final’ solution that satisfies Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris, is a moot point. General Musharraf has warned that unless such a solution is found, although he is now prepared to give it more time, the problem could erupt again some years down the road.
For the moment at least, the potential ‘spoilers’ of a series of concessions on Kashmir by both sides, have failed to create any momentum despite the attack on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service. As a consequence perhaps, the Hizbul Mujahideen, the largest Kashmiri guerrilla group, has in principle accepted the possibility of a ceasefire, should New Delhi propose any such measure.
It is axiomatic by now, but was not sufficiently clear to our military establishment and policy makers in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, that their reversal on the Afghan policy left the door ajar to the likely, reversal of jihad in Kashmir since all irregular warfare struggles would more than likely find themselves lumped into the ‘terrorist’ basket. That has now come to pass. History may therefore have passed by the armed militant movement in Kashmir. Whether they accept this or not, their best bet now appears to be to bide their time and explore whatever political openings present themselves during the continuing talks between Pakistan and India to normalise their overall relations and find a compromise on Kashmir that can prove acceptable to all.
posted by India News Watch at 5:15 PM
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