A budding relationship between U.S. and India

By Thomas Omestad

Posted 2/14/06

Through a period of foreign policy upheaval dominated by the Bush administration's war on terrorism, a major shift in U.S. policy with enduring consequences has received far less public attention in America: Washington's embrace of New Delhi and its aspirations to great-power status.

After decades of strategic distance, occasionally surly relations, and political resistance to change, U.S. policymakers have come to see the world's largest democracy as a partner that shares a remarkable array of interests–and as a rapidly emerging power that can lend unique weight to the Bush administration's ambition of promoting democracy globally. Policymakers in Washington are conscious of making history.

"I think if you look at American foreign policy worldwide, the greatest change you will see in the next three or four years is a new American focus on South Asia, particularly in establishing a closer strategic partnership with India," Nicholas Burns, under secretary of state for political affairs, said last May. "It will be the area of greatest dynamic positive change in American foreign policy."

The administration has decided not simply to welcome India's rise but to assist it. When Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited New Delhi last March, she presented to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh an outline for a "strategic relationship," a senior administration official said later. "Its goal is to help India become a major world power in the 21st century. We understand fully the implications, including military implications, of that statement."

Despite continuing concerns about India's nuclear posture, there is now in Washington a broad consensus on the desirability of welcoming–and, if possible, influencing–the way Indian power expands in economics, diplomacy, and military affairs. The administration, which touts improved ties with all of the great powers as one of its main foreign policy achievements, has shed any of the lingering Cold War-era instincts to view India as a sometime anti-U.S. power that for decades favored the now defunct Soviet Union. Now, U.S. officials talk of a "global partnership." The new mood was crystallized in July 2005 at a Washington summit between President George Bush and Prime Minister Singh. And the mood is likely to get even rosier–if image makers in both capitals have their way–when Bush visits India next month.

The July summit's most tangible outcome was a proposed deal that–if accepted by other nuclear countries and approved by Congress–will allow countries to sell civilian nuclear technology to India. Such sales have been forbidden because of India's development of nuclear weapons and its refusal to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Since first testing an atomic bomb in 1974–and more recently in 1998–India has been treated as a pariah state on nuclear matters. In Washington, the agreement has become a symbol of India's growing global stature, even as bilateral talks over its many sensitive details continue. The agreement is intended to put the pariah question to rest and to carve out a space for India in the club of nuclear-weapons states–albeit without the formal recognition. In return for the removal of restrictions on civilian nuclear technology, India would need to separate civilian from military nuclear facilities and place the civilian side under international inspection. It would also have to agree formally to international nonproliferation standards and to continue its moratorium on nuclear test blasts.

The July summit featured the sort of pomp that Bush is said to dislike personally and that has been used infrequently by his White House. But the pomp apparently reflected Bush's determination to make a lasting impression on his Indian guests. Said Bush, "Because of our shared values, the relationship between our two countries has never been stronger."

Though the nuclear agreement is generating the most attention–and controversy in Congress–the United States and India are developing a much broader policy agenda. A dialogue unthinkable in decades past is now beginning to flourish.

On the defense front, the United States and India have agreed on a framework for expanding cooperation in defense trade, coproduction of military equipment, and military-to-military ties. Washington has allowed Lockheed Martin and Boeing to pitch sales of F-16 fighter planes and F-18s, respectively. After the December 2004 Asian tsunami struck, the U.S. Navy joined with those of India, Japan, and Australia to galvanize rapid humanitarian relief. U.S. officials hailed the combined efforts as a sign of the potential for cooperation; some conservative analysts outside government, meanwhile, saw it as a harbinger of future power politics: the region's militarily capable democracies banding together to counter Chinese influence and maintain a favorable balance of power.

The United States and India have launched initiatives in other areas as well. Official dialogues are moving ahead on economic relations and energy; a "global democracy initiative"; space exploration, agriculture, education, science; and HIV/AIDS. The impulse behind the U.S. drive for a broader and deeper partnership with India enjoys uncommon strength because a diverse range of interests and ideological schools of thought have come to the same conclusion: India's rise can be a very good thing that ought to be embraced and, if possible, shaped.

That is not to say there is no resistance to the new India policy. Some in the policymaking apparatus have been slow to "dehyphenate" India and Pakistan, falling back on an old mentality that views relations with New Delhi as intimately linked to Washington's relations with an older, if troubled, ally in Islamabad. The initial opposition to moving beyond the sanctions and limitations stemming from India's nuclear posture proved strong in the Bush administration. As former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill complained in the summer 2005 issue of the National Interest, "These nagging nannies were alive and well in that State Department labyrinth." He recalls a pattern of "constant bureaucratic combat."

The backers of a closer U.S.-Indian relationship are focused, variously, on money, people-to-people relations, national security, and ideology. American corporate giants see in India an invaluable partner in the technology and service sectors, providing a relatively inexpensive but well-trained, English-speaking workforce. Microsoft's Bill Gates, for instance, is part of a growing legion of corporate leaders who have placed large bets on India. The growing presence of the Indian community in America is also fostering warmer political ties. More than 2 million people of Indian origin now live in the United States, and their savvy on Washington politics has caught the attention of Capitol Hill and both major political parties. Nearly 80,000 Indian students are studying at American universities. In India, some 65,000 Americans are taking advantage of new economic opportunities. Foreign-policy realists, meanwhile, have a practical focus on India's growing clout: It is on a trajectory to become the world's most populous nation, one of the five largest economies sometime early this century, and a strong military power fielding a permanent nuclear arsenal. It has the ability to play ever more helpful roles on several U.S. policy priorities: preventing weapons proliferation, counterterrorism, and revising global rules on trade and investment.

Supporters of Bush's theme of spreading democracy and liberty consider India's vibrant, multiethnic democracy a powerful model for other societies attempting to consolidate democratic gains. Bush himself touts "shared values" with India. And in India's fight against terrorism from Islamist militants, the administration sees a country facing a common threat, meshing neatly with its own priorities in international affairs. September 11, along with continuing concerns about the involvement of some Pakistanis in weapons proliferation and extremist groups, has bolstered the case of administration policymakers who favor ditching the legacy of American aloofness from New Delhi.

Many of the president's harder-line supporters see India as the answer to their strategic prayers: a permanent, democratic counterweight to a still-communist China. As Thomas Donnelly, a neoconservative analyst, wrote for the American Enterprise Institute, "Successfully wooing India is the key to preserving the liberal, American-led international order . . . Outside Tony Blair's Britain, only India stands as a natural great-power partner in building the next American century."

Some Pentagon officials agree, though the administration–sensitive about not jeopardizing hard-won gains in relations with China–avoids saying so directly. Nor does New Delhi want to play a direct part in any American strategy to offset (and limit) the power of China. Despite those sensitivities, the CIA has described India as a "swing state" in international politics, and Burns talks of India's contribution to "a stable balance of power in all of the Asia-Pacific region, one that favors peace through the presence of strong democratic nations enjoying friendly relations with the United States."

Serious barriers remain to a full blossoming of Indian-U.S. relations. In Washington, hawks will look for opportunities–sometimes clumsily–to align India with the United States on the long list of strategic issues that will arise over time. India will remain reluctant to be seen as a U.S. ally, even though its interests frequently lead to similar policy views. American pressure on India to side with it at the International Atomic Energy Agency against Iran for its nuclear cheating is just one example of things to come. If American conservatives believe India is not holding up its end of the emerging partnership, political support for fostering Indian power will be difficult to muster in Washington.

India's tradition of foreign policy autonomy will also put the brakes on the relationship, particularly if governments in New Delhi cannot adequately shape public opinion about closer relations with Washington. Nationalist-minded Indians are concerned that the proposed nuclear deal will place unacceptable limits on the Indian nuclear program. India expects not only full cooperation on technology but also support for its own political agenda, including eventual membership on the U.N. Security Council.

So far, the Bush administration has played coy on that question, refusing to support the Indian position but also suggesting that rising Indian power will need to be accommodated. That sort of dodging cannot last if the optimists on U.S.-Indian relations are to prevail. If Washington is seen as insisting on a one-sided agenda or being too assertive, India's rise may well evolve in a less pro-American direction–perhaps like an Asian version of a resolutely independent France in its posture toward the United States. While stronger ties seem inevitable, building the most ambitious sort of partnership will require careful, patient tending for decades–in both Washington and New Delhi.