Pakistani army operations in tribal areas and Pushtoonistan

Army operations and Pushtoonistan

By Sarfaraz Ahmed

Though the Pakistan government’s focus on South and North Waziristan and the army-led operations against the militants hiding there are apparently aimed at targeting Al-Qaeda activists and Taliban remnants, the continuing upheavals in those areas however are fraught with serious dangers for the Establishment. The main danger of following the present policy viz a viz North and South Waziristan is that the Pushtoonistan issue may once more flare to the disadvantage of Pakistan. The issue of Pushtoonistan, which was relegated to the background by Afghan governments until it was revived by Daoud Khan after he forced King Zahir Shah into exile in 1973 although he later tried to play down this “counter-productive” issue and improve relations with Pakistan as well as Iran and the Western countries. Since the ouster of last communist regime of Dr Najibullah and during the rule or misrule of Mujahideen and Taliban, Pakistan had been able to orchestrate and implement quite successfully its Afghan policy to safeguard its interests viz a viz Pushtoonistan issue in particular.

The current intensity in the army offensive in the tribal belt with consequent death toll can inject a new and timely lease of life among those who are alreading demanding in Pakistan the formation of “Afghania” or “Pukhtoonistan”—-an ethnic Pushtoon province which also comprises some areas of Balochistan, including Quetta. In the case of Quetta, a cold-war has been brewing between a large number of Baloch and Pushtoon nationalists for quite some time because of a dispute over Balochistan capital and its surroundings. The present army operations in North and South Waziristan may arguably be viewed by a number of Pushtoon as an act of ethnic cleansing. They could derive their argument from the “collateral damage” that often takes place during such situations. The Taliban, a purely Pushtoon outfit, that began its successful armed struggle in 1994 and controlled about 85 per cent of Afghanistan till its fall in 2001, could resort to “Pushtoon card” in order to improve its prospects in its ongoing battles with the US troops and broaden its support not among the Pakistann’s Pushtoon population but also among a large number of Afghan refugees who are still required to be repatriated. The outcome of its expected move could may earn its some dividends. But the scope of such a move however looks limited because of three broad reasons:

Firstly, Pukhtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party, the most important ethnic Pushtoon group that has been struggling for the past many years for the formation of Pukhtoonkhwa province in Pakistan is headed by a Durrani Pushtoon: Mahmood Khan Achakzai. His party had assembled tens of thousands of his partymen in Quetta after the ouster of Taliban to demand the formation of a Kabul government under Zahir Shah, a Durrani. Though Zahir Shah is not heading or included in the government, Hamid Karazi also belongs to the same Durrani (formerly Abdali) tribe. Secondly, there exists an old historical Durrani-Ghilzai rivalry while the Taliban are led by Ghilzais, who include Mullah Omar. Thirdly, the Awami National Party of Khan Abdul Wali Khan was always friendly with the communist governments, though these were predominantly led by Ghilzai Pushtoon.

When the death toll in Pakistan’s tribal areas continue to swell with every passing day, the year 2005 has seen a surge in the Afghanistan’s troubled south and east and roadside bomb attacks of the type seen in Iraq have become an almost daily occurrence. According to officials estimates, more than 1,000 people, most of them Taliban, have died so far this year. The dead include more than 50 US troops killed in combat, the bloodiest period so far for the US forces in Afghanistan.

Tribal areas and the complexities that are associated with them are a legacy that the British India has bequeathed for Pakistan. The Durand Line, which was laid down in 1893, brought the tribes living in the tribal belt within the British sphere of influence or under a vague British suzerainty, with the Raj exercising only the most tenous control over it. The continuing formidable resistance the Pakistan army is facing amply explains why the tribal belt escaped subjection to any external power and why a tribal form of society persisted there.

Parashotam Mehra, who is among researchers known for objectively explaining the tribal areas’ location between the two boundaries—an internal boundary, marking the end of direct British administration; and an external boundary, the Durand Line, in his book “The North-West Frontier Drama 1945-1947”, has writes:

“...on 2 September 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru had been sworn in as head of the interim government. His portfolio as Member for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations included tribal affairs as well. Which, at the provincial level, was the responsibility of the governor. Not long after assuming office, and in the wake of some aerial bombing, Nehru undertook the tour of the tribal area. This in the face of Caroe’s [Governor Sir Olaf Caroe] explicit advice to the contrary as well as that tof Wavell and Gandhi. In the event, he was exposed not just to hostile demonstrations but an almost fatal assault ...”

The inflow of Afghan refugees in Pakistan began in 70s, or in order to be more specific, since 1973 when Afghan king Zahir Shah was forced into exile by his cousin Daud Khan. But the initial arrivals of refugees or often called by Western writers as “Islamist exiles” included those who had landed in Pakistan more for their life than any other reason as they were involved in a failed coup against Daoud. And these refugees included Ahmed Shah Masoud, Gulbudin Hikmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani, who were later known as Mujahideen leaders across the world. The Islamists’ arrival therefore proved to be a golden opportunity for Pakistan and it was during these days when then prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto set up an “Afghan Cell”. These Islamist exiles were considered as an effective tool to counter any Pushtoonistan pressure.

Among all the noteable Islamist exiles or refugees of the 70s included Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, a Ghilzai Pushtoon, whose party was one of Seven Peshwar Mujahideen group fighting against the communist rule, is perhaps the only active actor on the present political map of Afghanistan. Sayyaf who became the main conduit for Mujahideen for getting Saudi military and economic assistance during Jihad, is said to be running fourth in the country’s parliamentary elections results.

In order to safeguard its own interests, it is therefore imperative for Pakistan to exercise extreme caution as far as its approach towards North and South Waziristan is concerned. It must not venture into this battle to the extent where it alienates the majority, if not entire, population of Pushtoon as historical evidence shows that this border or Durand Line is a porous frontier which could enable the Pushtoon living on both sides of this line to once again speed up their efforts towards the formation of Pushtoonistan.