Dr Ayesha Siddiqa on Pakistan's use of jihadis

From The Friday Times(Aug 12-18, 2005)

The cost of using non-state actors

Dr Ayesha Siddiqa

The recent bomb blasts in London require that all states that have employed violent non-state actors reconsider their approach. As the use of such actors in West and South Asia shows, it is difficult to completely control these elements. Their use in sub-conventional warfare is, therefore, not cost-efficient. Seen particularly in the India-Pakistan context, the sub-conventional warfare option has, in the long run, escalated Pakistan’s cost rather than India’s. Furthermore, the use of non-state actors as strategic reserve is not a viable option in the nuclear or the post-nuclear scenario. In case of a nuclear exchange – if the conflict escalates from the sub-conventional to the conventional and the nuclear – no one would live to tell the tale. In any case, it would mean the failure of deterrence.

Over the long term, the jihadi option has not only increased the cost for Pakistan but also shown the policy objective of acquiring strategic depth to be flawed. That is if strategic depth is not just measured in terms of territory but as a sum total of territory and resources. The fact that India today has greater financial resources, military hardware, knowledgebase and purchasing power means Pakistan’s strategic depth has steadily been eroded.

While the state tried to minimise the cost of defence and increase its depth by supporting non-state actors, this is not an efficient option any more. The continuation of non-state actors in a nuclear environment runs the risk of accidental conflict escalation that would eliminate all perceived strategic advantages.

The opportunity cost of using non-state actors or, in a larger context, ideology is extremely high. This is a lesson one learns from the extremely readable and thrilling book by Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan – Between Mosque and Military . While claiming to discuss the relationship between the military and the mosque, the book actually analyses the larger structure of the state’s use of religious ideology and ideologues to fulfil its interests. However, the book aught to be read along with Vali Nasr’s 2001 publication on the Islamic states of Malaysia and Pakistan. Haqqani’s excellent case study on Pakistan provides clothing to Nasr’s theory that in the two above-mentioned Muslim countries the state itself was party to manipulating and using religious ideology to further its political goals. Although Nasr’s discussion is more political, the argument gels well with Haqqani’s recently published work. Vali Nasr argues that the state, which may have some secular character or might not be an outright theocracy, could still adopt religious principles since these are not opposed to state’s hegemony. He focuses on General Zia-ul Haq’s period to elaborate his point.

Dr Siddiqa is currently a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington DC