Ayesha Siddiqa on why Pakistan has an image problem

At a meeting of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Q, the party’s secretary-general Mushahid Hussain has been quoted as saying the Pakistan High Commission in London mishandled the situation in the wake of the London blasts. He thinks the Pakistan HC should have proactively dispelled the impression that somehow Pakistanis were involved in the incident and should have informed the Britons of how Pakistan was fighting terrorism. Mr Hussain has also suggested holding a conference in London to explain Pakistan’s role in the war on terror.

Pakistanis were indeed shocked by news that three of the four bombers were of Pakistani origin and also deny that the bombers’ sojourns in Pakistan had anything to do with what they did on July 7 in London. There is indignation over why the world is pointing fingers at Pakistan. Why can’t other countries clean up their backyards? Why do they blame Pakistan for what happens in their countries? There must be some conspiracy against Pakistan.

In some ways this is correct. It is difficult to see how a brief visit to Pakistan could have turned these people into suicide bombers. The possibility is that they were already motivated to do something and came to Pakistan primarily to make connections. It would therefore be unwise and counterproductive for the British government to pretend that its involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan had nothing to do with the unfortunate incidents. Similarly, there is a need for the British community to evaluate inter-cultural dialogue and the existing nature of relations among communities.

However, while the British do their end of the exercise, Pakistan needs to seriously review the incidents and think about its alleged linkage with 7/7. It is important for policymakers to understand the connection.

There are two levels at which this connection must be evaluated. The first is the more surface aspect of Pakistan’s ongoing link with jihadi elements. Pakistan continues to be a fertile nursery for prospective terrorists. Extremist organisations or some elements of such outfits are allowed to hunt for victims that could be brainwashed into laying down their lives. Within the past 30 days, several reports have suggested the nexus between jihadi organisations and the army has not entirely been severed off.

The government has again started its crackdown against extremist organisations and elements. Interestingly, leaders of both Jaish and Lashkar cannot be found. The question is: Why did the government not crack down on these elements before the bombings? Why were the madrassahs allowed to function without registration despite the 2002 ordinance? Is it simply bureaucratic inefficiency, initiating damage control after the damage is done or is there more to this sloth?

The second aspect is more worrisome. The three bombers were a product of the peculiar Pakistani socio-political environment. Even if one were to suggest that the three were feeling left out and marginalised in an Anglo-Saxon, Judeo-Christian environment peculiar to the UK and the western world, there are still ample traces that link this frustration with the land from which the families originated. The frustration is a double-generational issue – the frustration of their parents added to their own – that manifested itself in such acts of violence. One has to carefully look at the social backgrounds of these families, most of which left their countries of origin in search of livelihood.

The frustration and resultant violence is also a class issue. Lacking means of social mobility and acceptance, these people moved to another country where they could find opportunities to excel. Their frustration on being rejects in their own country multiplied with time and got added to the disappointment felt by their younger generation at not being accepted by the dominant ethnic group in Britain. Of course, these people never thought about their own act of voluntary self-exclusion from the host community. The Pakistani/Asian neighbourhoods are ghettos of nationalism and social behaviour based on a rejection of the host culture. This is typical diaspora behaviour. However, what is important to note is that it is the combined frustration of two generations of being outcasts that the three bombers possibly tried to mitigate through their violent acts.

The path to paradise is beautiful and the entry to it is not class-based. In heaven, people will be judged by their piety and not social standing. Incidentally, martyrdom is one sure way to heaven.

The socially traumatised youth is prey to extremist clerics that advocate suicide bombings or violence against innocent people as retribution for the acute social injustice against Muslims in other parts of the world. These teachers are indeed parasitical because they do not themselves venture to sacrifice their lives but hunt for young men/women that could be sacrificed in the name of religious ideals.

Here, the link with the country of origin is crucial. Pakistan has unfortunately steadily built a reputation for exporting jihad to the West, China and other parts of the world. Pakistani diaspora has connections with extreme elements in Pakistan and propagate an exclusionist agenda. Driven by their existential crisis, community leaders are known for advocating exclusionary approach and supporting extremism imported from “back home”. For instance, a number of Pakistani-British community leaders have vehemently supported Osama bin Laden and continue to fund an extreme and exclusionary socio-religious ideology.

The problem gets worse in a situation where there is no dialogue to counter the pro-violence argument. Can one see a political discourse in Pakistan on violence? Random statements by political leaders condemning 9/11 or 7/7 are not sufficient. It is tragic that the main political parties, including those that are reputed to be secular, have not started a dialogue on the subject. The entire act of leaving the process of definition or redefinition of jihad to the government is criminal. Thus, Pakistan’s involvement in 7/7 is not just limited to its government but also involves the political elite.

It is essential for Pakistan’s political elite to realise the danger posed by the absence of an alternative agenda. Political parties must generate debate on the issue of violence. That is crucial.

Dr Siddiqa is currently a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington DC