An emerging alliance with India: Michael Barone

An emerging alliance with India

By Michael Barone

You didn't see it in the headlines this week, but it's likely to be more important in the long run than many things that received much more notice. The "it" in question is the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship signed Monday by U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee. This agreement provides for increased cooperation on research and development of high-tech weaponry and joint and combined training exercises.

This is big news—a lot bigger news than (to name a couple of items that got more attention recently) German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's expression of hope that things will turn out well in Iraq or Sen. Joseph Biden's call for 1,500 French gendarmes to help us there. A few European troops or trainers more or less are not going to make a difference in the outcome in Iraq. But our emerging alliance with India—and that is what it is, whatever label you put on it—can make an enormous difference over the next long generation in Asia.

Put it in historic perspective. From the 1950s to 1991, India was a de facto ally of the Soviet Union. It purchased Soviet military equipment, routinely opposed the United States in international forums and shared with the Soviets the purpose of cabining in China. The Soviets for their part took India's side against Pakistan, which in turn was supported by China and the United States. Remember that Henry Kissinger took off on his first secret flight to China from Pakistan.

The Indian-Soviet alliance came to a screeching halt with the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The Russians had little to offer India, and India needed new friends. Over the intervening years it became apparent that they had more interests in common with the United States than Jawaharlal Nehru or Indira Gandhi ever thought. As president, Bill Clinton played a constructive role by visiting India and increasing U.S.-India ties. George W. Bush carried on when, in his first months as president, he made a point of stopping by for an unscheduled 45-minute chat with India's foreign minister when he was meeting with Condoleezza Rice.

I have often wondered whether Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's decision soon after September 11 to cooperate with the United States was prompted by our improving relations with India. Bush administration officials have told me they don't think so. But it seems to me that Musharraf may have thought that if Pakistan didn't cooperate with the United States in its efforts against Afghanistan, India would have, with negative consequences for his regime.

In any case, since September 11 Bush and his administration have moved closer and closer to India. It is obvious that the two countries have much in common: the English language, representative democracy, the rule of law. Since 1991, India has dismantled much of the "permit raj" that choked its economy, and its leaders have enabled the market to do its magic work of promoting economic growth. In recent years the Indian economy has been growing about 6 percent a year, and millions of Indians have moved out of poverty. India has become a center of high-tech innovation. And India, like the United States, has long been a target of jihadist terrorists.

Last Monday's agreement was another step in the process of adding to the list of America's military allies in Asia. Japan has recently been building its military forces and despite the pacifist clauses in its Constitution has aided us in Afghanistan and Iraq and has spoken out against a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. Australia was a major partner in Iraq and has taken the initiative on other occasions, notably on tsunami relief. Now we are building closer military ties with India.

There is not likely to be a formal NATO-like alliance among Japan, Australia, India, and the United States. But increasingly there is the functional equivalent of one. There is fierce debate in many quarters whether China will emerge as a military threat. Some, like strategist Thomas Barnett, argue that China is too well integrated into the international economy to allow its gains to be lost by military aggression. Others argue that the Chinese are seeking to project their military strength outward and cannot be counted on to refrain from aggression in Taiwan. Whichever view you take, our emerging alliance with India is good news. Despite official denials, it provides something of a counterweight to China. And it increases the clout of a nation that is showing what representative democracy, the rule of law, and the free marketplace can do.